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Abstract 
 
The current study looks at the role working memory plays in risky-choice framing. 
Eighty-six participants took the Automatic OSPAN, a measurement of working memory; 
this was followed by a risky-choice framing task. Results show that participants with high 
working memory capacities demonstrate well-pronounced framing effects, whereas those 
with low working memory capacities do not. This pattern suggests that, in a typical risky-
choice decision task, individuals with high working memory capacity are especially 
likely to be influenced by contextual factors, such as the frame, and consequently 
demonstrate stronger framing effects. 
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Memory Reflected in Our Decisions:  
Working Memory Capacity and Risky Choice Framing 
 Throughout our lives, we are faced with many small and large decisions. Many of 
these choices involve some aspect of risk, like choosing whether to invest in certain 
stocks, deciding on medical treatment options, or even deciding whether to risk human 
lives. The most studied examples of risk and decision making involve risky choices 
presented within a positive or negative framework, or framing effects.  
Background 
 Research on framing effects has its origin in economic theory, most notably with 
Expected Utility Theory (e.g., Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). More recently, 
psychologists have begun looking at individual differences that may play a role in the 
facilitation of framing effects. Continuing in the research tradition of individual 
differences on framing effects, the purpose of this paper is to determine the relationship 
between working memory capacity (WMC) and framing effects. This paper begins with a 
review of the decision theories that brought about the discovery of framing effects, 
beginning with expected utility theory and leading to prospect theory. This is followed by 
an overview of research on framing effects, and a review of WMC. Finally, connections 
are made between these two lines of research and hypotheses drawn that make testable 
predictions for how WMC interacts with risky-choice framing. After providing an 
empirical test of the hypotheses, the paper concludes with a discussion of the theoretical 
implications of the findings. 
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Expected Utility Theory 
 In order to gain an appreciation for framing effects and their place in the study of 
judgment and decision making, there must first be an understanding of what spurred 
interest and theoretical development of these effects. To do this, an overview of expected 
utility theory is needed. The basis for expected utility theory is the calculation of 
expected value. In terms of choosing between options that have differing probabilities of 
occurring, calculating expected value consists of weighting the options by their 
probabilities. An example is if there is a choice between:  
(A.) A 20% chance of getting $1,000  
or  
(B.) A 25% chance of getting $400 
The expected value of each option is: (A) .20($1,000) = $200 or (B) .25($400) = $100, 
leaving Option A as the best option, according to expected value calculation. 
 Expected utility theory was proposed as a solution to the basic problem that there 
are factors beyond raw calculation that affect how a person perceives something’s value. 
The difference in utility between $1 and $1 million is much greater than $8 million and 
$9 million. In order to correct for this problem in expected value calculation, Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) formulated expected utility theory, which creates a 
numerical basis for calculating the amount of satisfaction (utility) a person can achieve 
when making a probabilistic choice between multiple options. An example can be found 
in a situation in which a person owes $5,000 to the bank by tomorrow, or else her home 
will go into foreclosure. She goes to Las Vegas and is offered a choice between:  
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(A). A 90% chance to win $3,000  
or  
(B). A 40% chance to win $5,000. 
Calculating expected value prompts the selection of Option A, but with expected utility 
the options are weighted according to the person’s subjective utility (U). Option A could 
be given a utility of 40, while B is given a utility of 100, due to the fact that Option B 
offers the full amount needed while Option A has positive utility as a gain, but does not 
fully satisfy the need. The calculation of these utilities leads one to choose Option B as 
the superior option (as seen below).  
(A) A 90% chance to win U(40) = .9(40) = 36 
(B). A 40% chance to win U(100) = .4(100) = 40 
 Although this approach is still widely used today and thought of as the benchmark 
for rational decision making in economics and decision making fields, some research has 
shown discrepancies between expected utility predictions and human behavior 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). One such finding is the framing effect (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981), in which two choices containing equal expected values will engender 
different choices depending on how the alternatives are presented. 
Prospect Theory 
Framing effects are derived from prospect theory predictions (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) and have become one of the foremost studied examples of rational 
decision making. Prospect theory was put forth as a descriptive model of decision making 
that is psychologically superior to expected utility theory. Prospect theory posits that 
outcomes are viewed in terms of gains and losses relative to a neutral reference point, as 
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opposed to expected utility theory, which looks at outcomes in terms of final states of 
wealth. The reference point can be affected by the description of a problem or the 
decision maker’s expectations, two aspects of decision making that expected utility 
theory does not take into account (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This effect is due to 
differences in perceived subjective value and is captured by the S-shaped value function 
(see Figure 1) which is concave for gains, yielding risk-aversive preferences (e.g., 
choosing a sure option over a gamble of equal expected value), and convex for losses, 
yielding risk-seeking preferences (e.g., choosing the risky gamble). 
Framing Effects 
Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) have proposed three different types of 
framing effects, which subsequently have been shown to represent independent processes 
(Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). I begin with a brief overview of two of these 
types of framing: attribute framing and goal framing. I end this discussion with an in- 
depth look at risky-choice framing. 
Attribute framing occurs when the description of an object or event is based on 
the targets positive or negative characteristics. In a classic example of attribute framing 
(Levin & Gaeth, 1988), participants are asked to rate ground beef that is either said to be 
“80% lean” or “20% fat.” People who receive the negative description (20% fat) tend to 
rate the ground beef as lower quality compared to those who receive the positive 
description (80% lean), despite the fact that the two descriptions are formally equivalent. 
This type of framing has been found to be very reliable and Levin et al. (2002) have 
shown that on average, people would spend 8.2 more cents for a pound of ground beef 
that was labeled as 80% lean compared to ground beef that was labeled 20% fat. 
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 Goal framing occurs when a persuasive message is framed in terms of the 
negative consequences of not performing an act or the positive consequences of 
performing an act. In a study by Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987), female participants 
were given either information about the negative consequences of not engaging in breast 
self-examination (BSE) or information about the positive consequences of engaging in 
BSE. The women who were given the negative information were more likely to engage in 
BSE. Although goal framing has been found to be the least reliable effect as compared to 
the other types of framing effects (Levin et al., 1998; Levin et al. 2002), moderating 
variables such as perceived outcome risk (Ferguson & Gallagher, 2007; Rothman, Kelley, 
Hertel, & Salovey, 2003) and context (McCormick & McElroy, 2009) can play a role in 
the facilitation of these effects. 
In the most widely tested example of framing, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
presented participants with an Asian disease problem (Appendix A) in which 600 lives 
were at stake. Participants were then presented with a set of alternatives, one risk-free and 
the other risky. The alternatives were framed either positively or negatively, in terms of 
the number of people that would be “saved” or “die.” Their findings revealed that, despite 
identical expected values, participants preferred the risk-free alternative when the 
problem was framed positively and the risky alternative when framed negatively. This 
type of task design is commonly referred to as “risky-choice” (Levin et al., 1998). 
  This effect is explained by prospect theory in terms of the S-shaped value 
function (v). When a person is given the “saved” condition of the Asian disease problem, 
they have the option of 200 people being saved or a 1/3 chance of 600 people being saved 
(2/3 chance no-one is saved). According to prospect theory, participants code this 
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problem as v(+200) vs. 1/3 × v(+600) + 2/3 × v(0). Due to the fact that the value function 
is concave for gains, v(+200) > 1/3 × v(+600) + 2/3 × v(0), and the participant is likely to 
choose the sure option. In the “die” condition of the problem, they have the option of 400 
people dying (v(-400)) or a 2/3 chance of everyone dying and a 1/3 chance of no-one 
dying (2/3 × v(-600) + 1/3 × v(0)). Since the value function is convex for losses, v(-400) 
< 2/3 × v(-600) + 1/3 × v(0), the participant is likely to choose the risky option 
(Kuhberger & Tanner, 2009). 
Risky-choice framing problems that follow the Asian disease format show 
reliable, moderately strong framing effects (Kuhberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998). 
However, the typical risky-choice framing effect can be stronger or weaker depending on 
the variables present within the decision, such as the use of scenarios as in the Asian 
disease problem or purely numerical problems involving the gain or loss of money 
(Fagley & Miller, 1997). This effect also has been shown to reverse or even disappear 
depending on the presentational format of the problem (Kuhberger & Tanner, 2009; 
Reyna & Brainerd, 1991) and the age group to which the problem is given (Reyna & 
Ellis, 1994). These findings have created opportunities for new approaches to risky-
choice framing research. Some avenues of research have looked at the role different 
processing styles play in creating stronger or weaker framing effects (Stanovich & West, 
2000; McElroy & Seta, 2003), whereas other research has looked at how memory 
processes affect framing (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). These perspectives engender new 
ideas and methods for looking further into the internal processes that underlie the risky-
choice framing effect. 
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Working Memory  
Working memory was first proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974), describing it 
as a limited-capacity system that holds and manipulates information. It is commonly 
viewed as the system responsible for the maintenance of information in memory in the 
face of interference (Engle, 2002). Because of its importance in cognitive processing, 
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) created a working memory span-task to measure 
individual differences in WMC. This task invigorated research interest in the topic as 
well as further development of working memory measurement.  
Research on WMC has discovered strong correlations between WMC and 
constructs such as fluid intelligence (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 
2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999), reading comprehension (Daneman 
& Merikle, 1996), and math ability (LeFevre, DeStefano, Coleman, & Shanahan, 2004). 
In each of these areas, higher WMC predicts better performance. WMC has also been 
shown to predict reasoning abilities. Multiple studies have shown that WMC can predict 
differences in strategy use when encoding information (Cokely, Kelley, & Gilchrist, 
2006; McNamara & Scott, 2001) as well as number and strength of alternate hypotheses 
one can generate when making probability judgments (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003). 
Those with low WMC tend to rely on rote-rehearsal (Turley-Ames & Whitfield, 2003) 
whereas those with high WMC appear to employ elaborative encoding, a process that 
generally leads to superior decision making for those with high WMC (Cokely & Kelley, 
2009). The difference in encoding techniques may distinguish high and low WMC with 
regard to traditional risky-choice framing tasks.  
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Working Memory and Framing 
 There has been considerable research and theoretical interest in how working 
memory may influence decision making. Some of the most intriguing findings have come 
from the investigation of working memory and framing. For example, neuroimaging 
technology has suggested that the prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in framing effects; 
an area of the brain that has also been implicated in studies measuring WMC. De 
Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, and Dolan (2006) provided participants with a series of 
financial risky-choice decision tasks. While performing the tasks, participants’ cortical 
activities were monitored using fMRI. Their findings revealed that there was increased 
activity in participants’ prefrontal cortex during the decision tasks. This finding coincides 
with work by Kane and Engle (2003) that suggests that the prefrontal regions of the brain 
play an important role in working memory function. 
One dual-process model that focuses on memory is fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1989, 1991). The model consists of two independent processes for encoding 
and storing information: verbatim memory and gist memory. Verbatim memory consists 
of encoding and storing precise details into long-term memory while gist memory 
consists of encoding and storing general qualities into long-term memory (Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1995). If a person were given a list of common dog names with Labrador 
excluded, then given another list ten minutes later with the same dog names as before 
with the exception that Labrador is included and asked to verify that the list of names is 
identical to the first; their answer will depend on the type of memory used. If verbatim 
recall is used, the person will recognize that Labrador was not on the first list because 
they will mentally picture seeing each dog name. If gist memory is used the person is 
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likely to believe that Labrador was on the first list because gist memory only encodes the 
fact that the list was composed of common dog names rather than the exact names on the 
list. 
Fuzzy-trace theory states that framing effects occur because people are focusing 
on the gist of information rather than verbatim information. Gist information consists of 
people preferring something over nothing in the gains condition and nothing over 
something in the loss condition as compared to verbatim information which consists of 
the exact numerical quantities in the framing problem (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991). Work 
with framing effects in children has discovered that younger children do not exhibit 
framing effects, because of the fact that they focus on verbatim information. As children 
age, framing effects begin to appear (Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna & Farley, 2006). This 
corresponds to the finding that as children age, their WMC increases (Dempster, 1981). 
Accordingly, people with high WMC may encoding more elaborative representations that 
enable reasoning based on gist (e.g., encoding a richer context), whereas people with low 
WMC may primarily focus on salient and easily available numerical quantities 
(verbatim). The prediction that can be made from this theoretical approach is that high 
WMC participants should show framing effects whereas low WMC participants should 
show little or no framing effects (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1991). 
From a theoretical approach, Stanovich and West (2000) have suggested that non-
normative reasoning would increase in tasks in which working memory is vital or when it 
becomes overloaded. In later research, Cokely and Kelley (2009) conducted a study in 
which participants were presented with a series of 40 gain/loss choice problems. This 
study was designed to test predictions for expected value choices and differences in how 
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participants encode and process information. To examine their hypotheses, both the gain 
problems (e.g., “gain $150” or “5% chance of gaining $2000”) and loss problems (e.g., 
“lose $50” or “5% chance to lose $4000”) were presented in a numerical format. Their 
findings revealed that people with a higher WMC made more choices which coincided 
with expected value compared to those with low WMC. They added that higher WMC 
did not mean that participants actually calculated expected value, but that participants 
with high WMC may be using elaborative heuristic search processes (i.e., personalization 
of the decision; what are real world implications of this decision, how does this affect me, 
etc.) rather than the use of an abstract calculation such as expected value.  
Predictions 
 The current experiment investigates how WMC interacts with the framing of a 
decision problem using Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) Asian disease problem in order 
to test two competing hypotheses that make distinctly different predictions for how 
working memory may influence decisions. First, one could expect the results to mirror 
those of Cokely and Kelley (2009), in that people with high WMC are better able to 
process the probabilities within the task, leading to decreased framing effects as 
compared to those with low WMC. Alternately, research by Delaney and Sahakyan 
(2007) indicated that people with high WMC are more context dependent than those with 
low WMC. High WMC participants in the Delaney and Sahakyan study were less able to 
recall a word list than low WMC participants after engaging in a task that involved a 
mental context change (from going through a word list to describing one’s parents’ 
house). Because risky-choice decision tasks such as the Asian disease problem contain a 
larger amount of contextual information (a disease threatening the lives of people), a 
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second hypothesis is that those with high WMC may be more affected by the contextual 
information within the scenario (the frame) than those with low WMC, leading to larger 
framing effects in those with high WMC. The latter hypothesis is also consistent with 
theoretical predictions derived from fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991). In 
sum, the predictions are that either high WMC participants will be better equipped to 
calculate the numerical quantities involved in the Asian disease problem leading to 
smaller framing effects than low WMC participants, or high WMC will show larger 
framing effects than low WMC participants because of their susceptibility to the 
contextual information in the Asian disease problem leading them to focus less on 
numerical information than the low WMC participants who will have less capacity to 
expend on the context surrounding the numerical information. 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-six undergraduates in Appalachian State University’s research pool 
participated in exchange for course credit. One participant was excluded from the data set 
because of low math performance on the Operation Span task, leaving the number of 
participants at eighty-five (30 male, 54 female, 1 unreported). Approval was given for 
this project by the Institutional Review Board on February 19, 2009 (Appendix B). All 
research conducted in relation to this project is in strict accordance with ethical 
guidelines for research with humans as stated by the Institutional Review Board. 
Materials 
The Turner and Engle (1989) Operation Span (OSPAN) task requires participants 
to verify the truth of math operations while trying to remember a set of unrelated letters. 
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This study uses an automated version of the Turner and Engle OSPAN task, developed 
by Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, and Engle (2005). For each trial, the participants were 
presented with a math problem and asked to determine the truth of the math problem (i.e., 
2/1 + 6 = 7). Immediately after the participant judged the truth of the math problem, they 
were presented with a letter to remember. The operation–letter pairings were presented in 
sets of two to seven items. Following each complete set, the participant was instructed to 
recall the letters in the order presented. In order to ensure that participants were not 
trading off between solving the operations and remembering the letters, an 85% accuracy 
criterion on the math operations was required for all participants. The participants 
received several sets of practice trials before beginning the task. For all of the span 
measures, items were scored for accuracy in specific item recall (i.e., correct letter) as 
well as the correct position within the serial order of presentation. Therefore the total 
score for the OSPAN represents total number of correct items as well as the correct serial 
position. 
Procedure 
 Participants entered the research lab, signed informed consent (Appendix C), and 
were asked to complete the OSPAN on the computer. When they finished the task, they 
were given the Asian disease problem and asked to rate their decision on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (Definitely would recommend A) to 7 (Definitely would recommend B). They 
were then debriefed and the session ended. 
Results 
 A stepwise regression was performed with the Asian disease rating as the 
dependent variable. The frame (gain/loss) was entered in the first model, followed by the 
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OSPAN score (WMC), then finally an interaction term was entered which modeled frame 
* WMC. The initial model showed that the frame significantly predicted Asian disease 
ratings, β = .283, t(82) = 2.673, p = .009, 95% CI [.243, 1.655], showing that an overall 
framing effect was present. The OSPAN scores did not predict Asian disease ratings, β = 
.025, t(81) = .233, p = .816, 95% CI [-.019, .024]. Finally, the interaction term 
significantly predicted Asian disease ratings   β = .688, t(80) = 2.313, p = .023, 95% CI 
[.007, .094]. The overall model explained a significant proportion of the variance for 
Asian disease ratings, R2 = .106, F(3, 80) = 4.282, p = .007. 
 In order to better understand the nature of the interaction, the two levels of the 
frame (gain vs. loss) were teased apart in the regression analysis with respect to WMC. In 
the gain frame, there was not a non-significant trend toward more risk averse Asian 
disease ratings as WMC increased, β = -.016, t(80) = -1.214, p = .228, 95% CI [-.04, .01]. 
The loss frame showed a significant increase toward risk-seeking Asian disease ratings as 
WMC increased, β = .034, t(80) = 1.983, p = .05, 95% CI [-.0001, .06]. This analysis 
shows an overall increase in the framing effect for those with high WMC and more 
consistency in ratings for those with low WMC (see Figure 2). 
Discussion 
 This experiment explored the impact of WMC on the choices individuals make in 
a risky-choice scenario. The results support the hypothesis that those who have high 
WMC are more sensitive to the frame within the risky-choice scenario, and therefore 
show framing effects, while there is no evidence for a traditional framing effect among 
those with low WMC. Those with high WMC showed slightly larger preference toward 
risk-aversion in the gain frame than those with low WMC, while showing a much larger 
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preference for risk-seeking in the loss frame than those with low WMC. The significant 
jump in risk-seeking for losses compared to the small difference in risk-aversion for gains 
is consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect theory, which describes 
people as being much more sensitive to losses than gains.   
 In order to reconcile the present findings with those of Cokely and Kelley (2009), 
methodological differences between the studies must be examined. An obvious difference 
between designs is the use of unequal expected values in Cokely and Kelley’s (2009) 
choice alternatives. Results from Fulginiti and Reyna (1993) show that when the 
expected values for alternatives in the Asian disease problem are slightly unequal (in a 
direction opposite to the typical framing preference) framing effects diminish. It may be 
the case that when equal expected values are presented, as in the Asian disease problem, 
this allows high WMC participants to “cancel out” that part of the alternative comparison 
and consequently, they may be more influenced by the frame. Conversely, when unequal 
expected values are involved, this may lead high WMC participants to focus more on that 
part of the alternative comparison and less on the frame. As a result, framing effects may 
be less robust for high WMC participants. 
 Another design difference between this study and that of Cokely and Kelley 
(2009) is the format of the decision task; numeric or verbal. It may be that the format of 
the task plays a role in how the task is processed. Specifically, it may be that when the 
decision task is presented in a numerical format, high WMC participants are focused on 
the numeric information whereas low WMC participants are unable to process this part of 
the task as efficiently and focus more on the frame. Such processing differences should 
lead low WMC participants to be more influenced by the frame when the task involves 
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numerically based information. Future research investigating working memory and 
framing should consider these factors as potential mechanisms for determining the 
strength and likelihood of the framing effect. 
The findings may provide insight for dual-processing approaches that have been 
widely embraced in the decision making literature (e.g., Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & 
Heier, 1996; Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996; 
Stanovich, 1999). The dual-process accounts posit that individuals construe information 
through a heuristic process which takes context and emotion into account (System 1 
processing) or an abstract, de-contextualized process of calculation that is typically 
thought of as higher order processing (System 2 processing; Stanovich, 1999). The 
traditional dual process view considers System 2 processing the more rational mode of 
processing (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Stanovich, 1999), but the results in this study 
suggest that encoding processes play an important role for the study of rational thought. 
Consideration of working memory as a variable resource, which can determine cognitive 
ability for making rational choices, may help clarify future research in this area (Cokely 
& Kelley, 2009).  
 In a similar manner, some dual-process approaches have relied on effort and 
importance as determining factors for the two processing styles. These findings tend to 
show that effort, as motivated by task importance (personal or situational), will influence 
the likelihood of biases and decision making fallacies such as the framing effect (e.g., 
Biswas, 2009; Igou & Bless, 2007; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 
2004). Future research in this area should consider how effort may influence an 
individual’s ability to perform decision making tasks in light of WMC. It may be the case 
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that an overall increase in effort by participants may increase overall framing effects 
among lower WMC participants.   
 In related work, Stanovich and West (1998, 1999, 2000) have explored whether 
rational choice may be tied to intelligence. Recently, Stanovich and West (2008) found 
that there was a small interaction between SAT and risky-choice framing effects, where 
those with higher scores displayed slightly larger framing effects (opposite to their 
predictions). Because WMC has been shown to have a moderate correlation with scores 
on IQ tests (Luciano et. al., 2001), the association between framing effects and higher 
cognitive ability is consistent with our findings. Further, Stanovich (2008) suggests an 
individual difference variable, the Master Rationality Motive (MRM), as a means for 
understanding rational choice. This approach suggests that individuals vary in how much 
they seek rational integration of information. This motive is seen as the impetus for 
searching across preferences, ending in rational integration. In other words, at varying 
levels, there is an innate desire for individuals to look back upon the reasons for their 
behaviors and integrate them in such a fashion that they feel such behaviors are justified 
according to their beliefs. As Stanovich points out, the MRM is to be differentiated from 
cognitive ability or intelligence.  However, this processing difference certainly seems to 
share similarities with WMC, leaving speculation for whether the differences in MRM 
processing could reflect differences associated with high and low working memory. In 
light of this investigation’s findings, it may be beneficial for future studies to approach 
the ability to integrate multiple levels of preference with one’s memory storage and 
maintenance capacity.  
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 A number of individual difference factors have been shown to attenuate the 
framing effect and are likely to rely on working memory. For example, need-for-
cognition, which reflects the extent that people engage in effortful thought and how much 
they enjoy it, has been shown to influence the strength of the framing effect (e.g., 
Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg & France, 2000; Simon, Fagley & Halleran, 2004; Smith & 
Levin, 1996; Zhang & Buda, 1999). Numeracy, a skill variable that tests individuals’ 
abilities to do statistical and probabilistic reasoning tasks seems a likely candidate for 
WMC due to the fact that it can require complex processing of numerical information. 
Similar to need-for-cognition, numeracy has also been shown to be a predictor of not 
only how prone individuals are to biases and decision making fallacies, but an indicator 
that there are multiple processes that may lead to biases as well as rational decision 
making (Peters & Levin, 2008; Peters et al., 2006). Peters and Levin (2008) suggested 
that WMC may interact with numeracy in creating different methods of approaching the 
risky-choice framing effect. 
 This investigation looked at the differences that exist in risky-choice decision 
making between those with higher verses lower cognitive ability, as measured through 
WMC. The results of this study have shown that higher cognitive abilities do not always 
reflect rational decision making. Rather than acting in accordance with normative 
reasoning, the results indicate that higher ability individuals may rely on more thorough 
encoding and decision making processes (Baron, 1985; Cokely & Kelley, 2009). 
Specifically, this study suggests that individuals higher in WMC rely on gist based 
memory representations due to differential encoding, leading them toward a more biased 
decision in the case of traditional risky-choice framing problems. This provides an 
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alternative approach to traditional dual process theories of rationality that focuses on 
quantitative differences in memory rather than qualitative differences in reasoning in 
order to predict performance. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. S-shaped value function developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
 
Figure 2. Predicted Asian disease rating as a function of high/low WMC and the frame. 
Higher OSPAN score represents higher WMC. 
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Figure 1. S-shaped value function developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
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Figure 2. Predicted Asian disease rating as a function of high/low WMC and the frame. 
Higher OSPAN score represents higher WMC.
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Appendix A 
Stimulus Materials: Asian Disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs 
are as follows: 
 
If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and 
a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
 
Please rate your opinion of these options on the following scale: 
1………2………3………4………5………6………7 
Definitely would     Definitely would  
Recommend A     Recommend B 
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Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs 
are as follows: 
 
If program A is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people will die. 
 
Please rate your opinion of these options on the following scale: 
1………2………3………4………5………6………7 
Definitely would     Definitely would  
Recommend A     Recommend B 
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Appendix B 
IRB Approval Form. 
From: _____________________________________ 
           Jay W. Cranston, M.D., Chair, Institutional Review Board  
 
Date: 2/19/2009  
 
RE: Notice of IRB Exemption  
 
Study #: 09-0164  
Study Title: The Relationship Between WMC and Decision Making  
Exemption Category: (2) Anonymous Educational Tests; Surveys, Interviews or 
Observations  
 
 
This submission has been reviewed by the above IRB Office and was determined 
to be exempt from further review according to the regulatory category cited above 
under 45 CFR 46.101(b). Should you change any aspect of the proposal, you must 
contact the IRB before implementing the changes to make sure the exempt status 
will continue. Otherwise, you will not need to apply for annual approval renewal. 
Please notify the IRB Office when you have completed the study.  
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Appendix C 
Consent Form for Participants. 
 
APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
Informed Consent for Participants in Research  
Projects Involving Human Subjects 
                                        
Title of Project:  Decision Making  
Investigator(s):  Jonathan Corbin, Cassie Black, Kelli Haas, James Mills, Dr. Todd 
McElroy 
 
I. Purpose of this Research/Project  
 
The study in which you are being asked to participate is exploring the relationship 
between working memory capacity and decision making. This type of study is important 
to researchers and educators because it may allow them to understand rationality which in 
turn can promote more rational decisions. 
 
II. Procedures 
 
In today’s session you will be asked to take part in a computerized task. You will also 
complete a questionnaire in which you will make a decision. Your involvement will only 
be necessary on this one occasion and will take place in the Psychology Research Lab.   
 
III. Risks 
 
There are no anticipated physical or psychological risks associated with participating in 
this study. 
 
IV. Benefits  
 
We cannot guarantee any direct benefits for taking part in this study.  One benefit to you 
is the opportunity to learn about how empirical research is conducted in the field of 
psychology. However, while you may not directly benefit from participating in this study, 
your participation will help to increase knowledge that could help others in the future. 
                                    
V. Extent of Anonymity and Confidentiality 
 
Please be assured that confidentiality is a priority with this study.  The only record we 
will have of your participation will be your name on this informed consent statement.  
During data collection, all data will only be connected using a participant number.  This 
number will be the same for all aspects of data you provide, but will not be included on 
the informed consent statement.  Therefore, it will be impossible for anyone to identify 
any participant by the responses that he or she gives. 
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VI. Compensation 
 
In the event that you are receiving course credit for you participation, we will fill out a 
course credit form that you may return to your instructor for credit. 
 
VII. Freedom to Withdraw 
 
The previous information is provided so that you can determine whether you wish to 
participate in this study.  You may choose not to answer specific questions or respond to 
experimental situations without penalty.  Your participation is voluntary, and you should 
be aware that even if you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw from the 
experiment at any time, without penalty.  Choosing not to participate in this study will 
not affect your relationship with Appalachian State University, its instructors, or the 
students involved in conducting this study in any way. 
 
VIII. Approval of Research  
 
Appalachian State University and the Psychology Department support the practice of 
protection for human subjects participating in research.  Accordingly, this research 
project has been approved, as required, by the Institutional Review Board of Appalachian 
State University. 
 
_____________________          __________________________ 
 IRB Approval Date                           Approval Expiration Date 
 
IX. Subject's Responsibilities 
 
I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. I have the following responsibilities: 
 
• I agree to participate seriously, and honestly, and to the best of my ability. 
 
• I will refrain from discussing my participation with friends or acquaintances who 
may also participate in this research project until the study has been completed in 
May of 2009. 
 
X. Participant’s Permission 
 
I have read and understand the Informed Consent and conditions of this project. I have 
had all my questions answered. I hereby acknowledge the above and give my voluntary 
consent:  
                                        
_________________________________________________Date__________ 
Subject signature 
 
Should I have any questions about this research or its conduct, I may contact: 
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Cassie Black   Jonathan Corbin  Kelli Haas 
Investigator   Investigator   Investigator 
(828) 719-5502  (828) 230-0671  (704) 301-7075 
lb47644@appstate.edu      corbinj@appstate.edu  kh51845@appstate.edu 
 
If, at any time during this study, you feel your rights have been violated, you may contact 
the Institutional Review Board by mail, email, or phone. 
Robert L. Johnson                         828-262-2692                      johnsonrl@appstate.edu 
Administrator, IRB                            Telephone                                  e-mail 
Graduate Studies and Research 
Appalachian State University 
Boone, NC  26608 
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